Search results for "Infinite horizon"

showing 3 items of 3 documents

BARGAINING WITH COMMITMENT UNDER AN UNCERTAIN DEADLINE

2006

We consider an infinite horizon bargaining game in which a deadline can arise with positive probability and where players possess an endogenous commitment device. We show that for any truncation of the game, the equilibrium agreement can only take place if the deadline arises within this finite horizon. Since the deadline is an uncertain event, the equilibrium exhibits agreements which are delayed with positive probability.

Commitment deviceComputer Science::Computer Science and Game TheoryGeneral Computer ScienceTruncationFinite horizonC78 [Bargaining endogenous commitment delays uncertain deadline JEL Classification]jel:M2MicroeconomicsEconomicsjel:C0Infinite horizonStatistics Probability and UncertaintyBusiness and International Managementjel:D5jel:B4Mathematical economicsComputer Science::Operating Systemsjel:C6jel:D7Positive probabilityComputer Science::Databasesjel:C7Event (probability theory)International Game Theory Review
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Partially revocable commitments in a negotiation with a deadline

2004

Abstract [Fershtman, C., Seidmann, D., 1993. Deadline effects and inefficient delay in bargaining with endogenous commitment. Journal of Economic Theory 60, 306–321] showed that the presence of an irrevocable endogenous commitment with a fixed deadline results in the so called deadline effect. In this paper we analyse the effects of partially revocable endogenous commitments of a seller in an infinite horizon negotiation in which a deadline can arise with positive probability. We obtain that when the commitment possesses a sufficiently large revocable part not only the inefficient delays disappear and an immediate agreement is reached but also the commitment has a value. On the other hand, …

MicroeconomicsEconomics and EconometricsNegotiationWelfare economicsmedia_common.quotation_subjectValue (economics)EconomicsComputingMilieux_COMPUTERSANDSOCIETYInfinite horizonPositive probabilitymedia_commonResearch in Economics
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An infinite-horizon model of dynamic membership of international environmental agreements

2007

Abstract Much of the literature on international environmental agreements (IEAs) uses static models, although most important transboundary pollution problems involve stock pollutants. The few papers that study IEAs using models of stock pollutants do not allow for the possibility that membership of the IEA may change endogenously over time. In this paper we analyse a simple infinite-horizon version of the static model of self-enforcing IEAs, in which damage costs increase with the stock of pollution, and countries decide each period whether to join an IEA. Using a quadratic approximation of the value function of the representative country we show that there exists a steady-state stock of po…

PollutionEconomics and EconometricsEconomyStatic modelmedia_common.quotation_subjectBellman equationTransboundary pollutionEconometricsEconomicsInfinite horizonManagement Monitoring Policy and LawStock (geology)media_commonJournal of Environmental Economics and Management
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